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Abstract
Personal bankruptcies in the United States have increased dramatically, rising
from 1.4 per thousand working age population in 1970 to 8.5 in 2002. We use
a heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with competitive financial intermediaries who can observe households’ earnings, age and current asset holdings to
evaluate several commonly offered explanations. We find that increased uncertainty (income shocks, expense uncertainty) cannot quantitatively account for
the rise in bankruptcies. Instead, stories related to a change in the credit market environment are more plausible. In particular, we find that a combination
of a decrease in the transactions cost of lending and a decline in the cost of
bankruptcy does a good job in accounting for the rise in consumer bankruptcy.
We also argue that the abolition of usury laws and other legal changes are
unimportant.
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(email: tertilt@stanford.edu). We thank Martin Gervais, Jeremy Greenwood, Karen Pence, JoséVı́ctor Rı́os-Rull and seminar participants at the 2005 Philadelphia Fed Consumer Credit & Payments conference, the SITE 2004 conference, the 2003 Western-Toronto Macro Conference, the SED
Meetings in Paris and Florence, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Bank of Canada,
the European Central Bank, and UC Davis, Illinois, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Rochester, Texas-Austin,
York and Queen’s Universities for helpful comments. Livshits acknowledges financial support from
the Arts, Humanities & Social Sciences Fund of the UWO. Livshits and MacGee acknowledge financial support from SSHRCC and from the Economic Policy Research Institute. Tertilt is grateful
to financial support from NSF grant No. 0519324. We would like to thank Jie Zhou for excellent
research assistance.

1

1

Introduction

The past thirty years have witnessed an explosive growth in the number of consumer
bankruptcy filings in the United States. Personal bankruptcies have increased from
1.4 per thousand of the working age population in 1970 to 8.5 in 2002 (see Figure 1),
with virtually all of the increase occurring between 1980 and 2000. This dramatic rise
in bankruptcies has motivated a large literature on potential explanations. Somewhat
surprisingly, little effort has been made to understand the quantitative implications
of these stories. In this paper, we address this void and quantitatively evaluate six
commonly offered explanations of the dramatic increase in consumer bankruptcies.
These potential explanations can be grouped into two categories: (i)“uncertainty”
has increased leading to an increased number of households in financial trouble or
(ii) changes in the credit market environment have made bankruptcy more attractive
or expanded households’ access to credit. The “uncertainty” category includes three
stories. The first two stories involve an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty at the
household level, due to increased labor earnings volatility or an increase in the number
of U.S. households without medical insurance (Barron, Elliehausen, and Staten (2000)
and Warren and Warren Tyagi (2003)). The third story we consider argues that
compositional changes in the population – the passing of the baby-boomers through
the prime bankruptcy ages and changing family structure – have increased the number
of risky households (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000)).
The second category includes three possible changes to the credit market environment. Perhaps the most common explanation of the rise in bankruptcy filings is
that the cost of filing for bankruptcy has declined (Gross and Souleles (2002)). A
frequently heard version of this story is that the “stigma” attached to bankrupts has
fallen (Buckley and Brinig (1998) and Fay, Hurst, and White (2002)), while some have
argued that amendments to the bankruptcy code in the U.S. made bankruptcy more
attractive to potential filers (Shepard (1984) and Boyes and Faith (1986)). Another
explanation is that the removal of interest rate ceilings, following the US Supreme
Court’s 1978 Marquette decision, eased the expansion of credit to higher risk individuals by allowing lenders to charge higher risk premia (Ellis (1998)). The final channel
we consider is that credit market innovations (such as the development and spread
of credit scoring) facilitated the increase in credit granted to households by reducing
the transaction costs of lending (Barron and Staten (2003), Ellis (1998)).
Disentangling these explanations is challenging as several of them involve legislative
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reforms and changes in the economic environment that happened at roughly the
same time. The main tool that we use to deal with this challenge is an equilibrium
model of consumer bankruptcy. Our approach is based on the premise that any
explanation of the rise in bankruptcy filings should be consistent not only with the rise
in bankruptcy filings but also with observed changes in the level of household debt,
average borrowing interest rates and the charge-off rate. By using an equilibrium
model of consumer bankruptcy we are able to derive the quantitative implications
of different explanations along each of these dimensions. We can thus evaluate each
explanation by comparing the model’s implications to four key empirical observations:
the increase in the level of bankruptcy filings, the increase in the ratio of unsecured
consumer debt to disposable income, little change in the average real interest rate
for unsecured lending, and an increase in the charge-off rate. In addition, we use
the comparison with Canada as a basic consistency check of several stories. This
comparison is useful since Canada experienced a similar rise in filings during the
1980s and early 1990s, but did not undertake the same legislative reforms as the U.S.
The equilibrium bankruptcy model we use is a heterogeneous agent life-cycle model
with incomplete markets which builds upon Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006).
Each period, households face idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding their income and
“expense shocks” (exogenous changes in asset position meant to represent uninsured
medical bills, costs of divorce and unwanted children). Upon realization of this uncertainty, households decide whether or not to file for bankruptcy, given some bankruptcy
rules.1 If bankruptcy is not declared, households can borrow (and save) via one period
non-contingent bonds with perfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Financial
intermediaries can observe each household’s earnings process, age and current asset
holdings when making loans. An equilibrium result is that the price of debtors’ bonds
varies with their current income, age and level of borrowing. It should be noted that
in this paper we focus on Chapter 7 filings. Therefore, we abstract from durable
goods and focus solely on the market for unsecured consumer credit.2
Our main findings are as follows. We argue that the rise in bankruptcy is primarily
due to changes in the credit market environment (broadly defined). In particular, our
findings suggest that a decline in the cost of filing for bankruptcy together with a
decline in the cost of extending credit is required in order to match the U.S. expe1

While some people have advocated behavioral reasons for consumer bankruptcy (see Laibson,
Tobacman, and Repetto (2000)), we concentrate on rational models of bankruptcy in this paper.
2
A study cited by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997, p.136) found that only 5
percent of Chapter 7 cases yielded assets which could be liquidated to repay creditors. This suggests
that abstracting from durable goods is reasonable given our focus on Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
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rience. While financial market liberalization in the US may have been a necessary
condition for the increased access of risky borrowers to credit, we argue that it is not
a main driving force. Our findings also suggest that “uncertainty” based stories play
a relatively small role in the rise in bankruptcies. Using our estimate of the changes in
expense uncertainty (primarily medical expenses), we find that this channel accounts
for at most 20% of the increase in filings. Increased volatility of household earnings
also does not appear to play a significant role in the rise. We also find that changes in
the age structure of the population are quantitatively unimportant (and much smaller
than Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) suggest). Finally, our calculations imply that the increase in the number of unmarried (and divorced) people by itself is
unlikely to have played a quantitatively important role in accounting for the rise in
bankruptcies.
These findings suggest a more nuanced view of the factors associated with the rise
in bankruptcies than the existing literature. Our results suggest that papers emphasizing “uncertainty” based stories (such as Warren and Warren Tyagi (2003) and the
SMR study summarized in Luckett (2002)) overstate the importance of these factors.
Closest in spirit to our work are Moss and Johnson (1999), Athreya (2004), and Gross
and Souleles (2002) who each analyze a subset of the alternative explanations analyzed in this paper (neither considers changes in income or expense uncertainty). All
three papers argue that changes in the credit market environment appear to be the
primary driving force behind the rise in filings. However, they differ in what exactly
these changes mean. Moss and Johnson (1999) base their conclusions on an informal
analysis of credit and borrowing data as well as some historical literature. Based on
this historical perspective and data, they argue that the main source of the increase
in bankruptcies is an increase in the share of unsecured credit held by lower income
households.3 While their arguments seem plausible, they do not attempt to assess
these channels quantitatively. Gross and Souleles (2002) examine a data set of credit
card accounts from 1995 to 1997 and argue that the higher default rate at the end of
their sample is consistent with a decline in the cost of bankruptcy. Athreya (2004) is
closest to our paper in the sense that he also uses an equilibrium model of bankruptcy
to examine several stories and evaluates them by comparing observable implications
from the model to the data. He argues that a decline in stigma alone would lead to
a counterfactual decline in the ratio of revolving debt to disposable income. Athreya
3

The three main reasons they cite are interest-rate deregulation and falling inflation, the rise in
home equity lending, and the bankruptcy amendments of 1984 that encouraged creditors to lend
more to low income consumers.
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also finds that a reduction in the transaction cost of lending can generate the rise in
filings. In the experiments he undertakes, however, the fall in the transactions cost
leads to a significantly higher debt to income ratio than that observed in the data.
In contrast, we find that a “combination” of credit market changes is consistent with
both the changes in filings and the change in the ratio of unsecured debt to income.
The equilibrium model of bankruptcy that we use is part of a recent literature
(motivated in part by the dramatic rise in bankruptcies and the related policy debates) on equilibrium models of consumer bankruptcy.4 Both Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2006) and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2005) outline
dynamic equilibrium models where interest rates vary with borrowers’ characteristics, and show that for reasonable parameter values, these models can match the
level of U.S. bankruptcy filings and debt-income ratios. Athreya (2002) analyzes the
welfare implications of different bankruptcy laws while Li and Sarte (2006) analyze
the consumers choice of Chapter 7 versus 13 using dynamic equilibrium models of
bankruptcy. Despite this recent interest in using numerical models to analyze consumer bankruptcy, little work has been undertaken to use these models to evaluate
alternative explanations of the rise in bankruptcies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize background
information on consumer bankruptcy in Section 2. The basic environment for evaluating the stories is presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present our results, and
Section 6 concludes.

2

Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in the U.S.

This section provides background information on consumer bankruptcy in the U.S.
and changes in unsecured consumer borrowing, average interest rates, charge-off rates
on consumer borrowing as well as characteristics of consumer bankrupts between the
early 1980s and late 1990s. These facts will play an important role in helping to
distinguish between alternative explanations of the rise in consumer bankruptcies.
Our decision to focus attention on this time period is driven by the fact that most of
the rise in filings took place during this twenty year period as well as data availability.
4

See Athreya (2005) for a more detailed survey.
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2.1

Consumer Bankruptcy Law

American households can choose between two bankruptcy procedures: Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13.5 Legal actions by creditors and most garnishments are halted upon filing
for bankruptcy, including phone calls and letters from creditors seeking repayment.
Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged in exchange for non-collateralized
assets above an exemption level and debtors are not obliged to use future income
to repay debts.6 Chapter 13 permits debtors to keep their assets in exchange for a
promise to repay part of their debt over the ensuing 3 to 5 years.
Most bankrupts file under Chapter 7 (approximately 70 percent), which is the
focus of our paper. Debtors who file under Chapter 7 are not permitted to refile
under Chapter 7 for six years, although they may file under Chapter 13. Filers must
pay the bankruptcy court filing fee of $200 and fees for legal advice that typically
range from $750 to $1,500 (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000)). In addition,
a debtor filing for bankruptcy has to submit a detailed list of all creditors, amounts
owed, all assets, monthly living expenses as well as the source and amount of income.
A typical Chapter 7 bankruptcy takes about 4 months from start to completion.

2.2

Bankrupts over Time: Have They Changed?

We begin by briefly reviewing the limited evidence on changes in the characteristics
of bankrupts over the past twenty-five years. What we find is surprising: Despite
the dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings, the typical bankrupt today is remarkably
similar to the typical bankrupt of twenty years ago (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
(2000), Warren (2002)). A typical bankrupt is lower middle-class (30-50% poorer than
the average household), in their thirties with an extremely high debt-to-income ratio.
Indeed, if anything, the available evidence suggests that bankrupts today have lower
income relative to the median household, slightly higher debt-to-income ratios and
hold more unsecured debt, especially credit card debt.
Data on bankrupts’ debt and income from several U.S. studies is reported in Table
1. Where possible, we have reported both the average and median values as well as
the implied debt-to-income ratios. It is worth emphasizing that there is a paucity
of systematic studies of bankrupts over time, and that care should be exercised in
5

See Mecham (2004) for a detailed description of consumer bankruptcy law in the United States.
The 2005 bankruptcy reform requires households with income above a threshold to enter into a
payment plan.
6
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interpreting the findings of the available studies as they are based upon samples from
different states (see Appendix B for a description of the samples used in the studies).
The first four rows in Table 1 summarize the data from two surveys conducted
and reported by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000). These figures are for all
bankrupts, and include both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers. Their data indicate
that while the average and median amount owed by bankrupts (in constant dollars)
remained roughly constant during the 1980s, debt-to-income ratios increased slightly.
The remaining rows in the table summarize data for Chapter 7 filers only. The data
on Chapter 7 filers also suggest that the debt-to-income ratios of bankrupts have
increased while the average real income of the typical bankrupt has not changed by
much. While Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) do not report average income by category
of filers, they do report that the average incomes were between $24,300 and $26,600
(in 1991 $). These figures are close to those reported by Bermant and Flynn (1999),
although the average incomes found in the Ohio and Utah studies were substantially
lower.
Table 1: Liabilities and Assets of Bankrupts in the U.S. (1997$)
Sample Avg Debt∗ Med Debt∗ Avg Uns∗ Med Uns∗ Avg Inc∗ Med Inc∗
1981
$68, 154
$37, 002
$27, 365
$12, 452 $27, 861
$26, 439
∗
D/Y
2.44
1.40
0.98
0.47
1991
$65, 158
$34, 795
$26, 618
$15, 128 $23, 927
$21, 115
D/Y
2.72
1.65
1.11
0.72
78/79 D/Y
1.86
0.34
1.14
0.15
1980 D/Y
1.56
0.78
0.87
0.46
Ohio 1997
$61, 320
$24, 303
$29, 529
$19, 515 $19, 641
$18, 756
D/Y
3.12
1.30
1.50
1.04
1997/98
$81, 696
$42, 810
$43, 032
$23, 190 $26, 568
$22, 800
D/Y
3.07
1.87
1.62
1.02
Utah 1997
$73, 327
$31, 981
n/a
n/a $18, 864
$16, 440
D/Y
3.89
1.95
n/a
n/a
∗

Avg = average, Med = median, Uns = unsecured debt, Inc = income, D/Y = ratio of debt to income.
Source: The rows labeled 1981 and 1991 are from Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000), Table 2.4. The 78/79 and
1980 values are reported by Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993). The Ohio 1997 data are from a survey of Ohio bankrupts
reported in Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000), Table 2.4. The 1997/98 data is reported by Bermant and Flynn
(1999). The Utah 1997 data are from Lown and Rowe (2002).

The key fact that we take from the (limited) evidence summarized above is that
the rise in bankruptcies has been accompanied by an increase in the debt-to-income
ratios of bankrupts. We will make use of this fact later in the paper to help evaluate
7

Table 2: Key Observations
Fact
Chapter 7 filings
Average borrowing interest rate
Debt/Income ratio
Charge-off rate

1980-84
0.25%
10.95-12.05%
5.0%
1.9%

1995-99
0.83%
10.93-12.84%
9.0%
4.6%

alternative explanations of the rise in consumer bankruptcies. In particular, we will
argue that some of the explanations that we explore in this paper counter-factually
generate a large decrease in the debt-income ratio of bankrupts.

2.3

Aggregate Data: Bankruptcy and Borrowing 1980-1999

We now take a closer look at the bankruptcy numbers and related changes in credit
markets. We summarize the four key facts in Table 2. In Sections 4 and 5 we will
use these facts to evaluate the stories.
Since our model abstracts from durable goods, the relevant bankruptcies in the
data are non-business Chapter 7 filings.7 The average number of non-business Chapter 7 filings between 1995 and 1999 was roughly 850,000, which is 0.83% of all households. Filings over 1980-1984 were much lower, averaging 210, 000 per annum, which
corresponds to an annual filing rate per household of 0.25%.
Contemporaneous with the increase in filings was a substantial growth in consumer
borrowing. Figure 2 shows this increase for four different debt measures. Given our
focus on Chapter 7 filings, the relevant target for our model is unsecured debt. Unfortunately, the reported data does not break out secured versus unsecured measures of
consumer credit. Consumer credit – which includes secured loans for vehicles, student
loans as well as unsecured loans such as credit cards, installment loans and lines of
credit – has remained roughly constant relative to disposable income in the U.S. between 1970 and the mid 1990s. The closest reported measure of unsecured consumer
debt is revolving credit, which consists mainly of credit card debt and outstanding
balances on unsecured revolving lines of credit. While revolving credit has increased
7

The filings data is an upper bound on consumer bankruptcies, since some households are counted
twice when partners choose to file separately and because some filings caused by the failure of
unincorporated small businesses are counted as chapter 7 non-business filings.
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dramatically, this is partially due to the substitution of credit card for installment
credit. To correct for this, we constructed an estimate of unsecured credit over 19831999. We define unsecured credit as the sum of revolving credit and the unsecured
portion of non-automobile non-revolving consumer debt (a more detailed discussion
is in Appendix A). The estimates are plotted in Figure 3 as a percentage of personal
disposable income, along with revolving credit. While our calculations suggest that
the rise in revolving debt significantly overstates the increase in unsecured debt, they
also imply an substantial increase between 1983 and 1999 in the unsecured debt to
income ratio. This gives a debt-income ratio of roughly 9% for the late 1990s and 5%
for the early 1980s.
The Federal Reserve reports two interest rates on unsecured loans for the time
periods we examine – the average (nominal) interest rate for two-year personal loans
and the average interest rate on credit cards. We compute the real rate of interest
using the one-year ahead CPI inflation rate and then compute the average for each
of the two periods, 1981-1986 and 1996-2000. This calculation implies an average
real cost of unsecured consumer borrowing of between 11.0% and 13.0%. Somewhat
surprisingly, this calculation implies very little change in real unsecured borrowing
interest rates.8
The small change in real borrowing interest rates is even more surprising given
the increased rate of non-repayments on consumer loans. One common measure of
non-payment is charge-off rates, which measure the value of loans written off from
the books (net of recoveries) and charged against loss reserves as a percentage of
average loans.9 Unfortunately, the charge-off rate series constructed by the Board of
Governors begins in 1985. To extend this series backwards, we splice this series with a
series reported by Ausubel (1991).10 Charge-offs on credit cards have increased from
about 1.9% to 4.6% between the 1980-84 and 1995-99 periods. As Figure 4 illustrates,
charge-offs move in parallel with the bankruptcy rate.
8

One might expect an increase in the real rate given the high inflation rates during the late 1970s
and early 1980s. However, nominal interest rates on personal loans fell during this time (from 17%
to 13.7%), while average inflation declined from 5.5% in 1981-85 to 2.5% in 1996-2000.
9
See Furletti (2003) for an overview of data sources and measurement methodology of chargeoffs. While roughly 40% of credit card charge-offs are due to bankruptcies, the rest is mandatory
charge-offs in response to delinquent loans, many of which ultimately end up in bankruptcy.
10
While the level of the Ausubel series is slightly below that of the Board series, the two series
move together for the years they overlap.
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3

Basic Environment for Evaluating the Stories

In this section, we briefly outline the model used to evaluate the stories, and describe
our benchmark parametrization which serves as a starting point for the numerical
experiments.

3.1

The Model

We extend the “Fresh Start” model of consumer bankruptcy of Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2006) by allowing for three additional costs of bankruptcy (a utility
cost, a burning cost and a fixed cost of filing) as well as an interest rate ceiling.
These extensions allow us to evaluate several stories of changes in the credit market
environments as a potential driving force of the rise in bankruptcies.
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of households who
live for J periods. Each generation is comprised of measure 1 of households facing
idiosyncratic uncertainty. There is no aggregate uncertainty. Markets are incomplete
and agents can borrow using non-contingent person-specific one-period bonds and
save at an exogenously given interest rate. Households have the option to declare
bankruptcy.
Households
Household maximize expected discounted life-time utility from consumption:
E

J
X

µ
β

j−1

j=1

u

cj
nj

¶
(3.1)

where β is the discount factor, cj is household consumption and nj is the size of a
household of age j in equivalence scale units.
The labor income of a household i of age j is the product of an age-dependent
labor endowment and productivity shocks:
yji = ej zji ηji ,

(3.2)

where ej is the deterministic endowment of efficiency units of labor, zji is a persistent
shock to the household’s earnings, and ηji a transitory shock.
Households face a second type of uncertainty: They may be hit with an idiosyncratic expense shock κ ≥ 0, κ ∈ K, where K is a finite set of possible expense shocks.
10

The probability of shock κi is denoted πi . An expense shock directly changes the
net asset position of a household. Expense shocks are independently and identically
distributed, and are independent of income shocks.
A household can file for bankruptcy. In that case, all debts are discharged, and the
household enters the following period with a balance of zero (unless hit by an expense
shock that period). Bankruptcy filers face several types of “punishment” which are
meant to proxy for features of the U.S. Chapter 7. First, a fraction γ of earnings is
garnisheed by creditors in the period of filing. Second, filers cannot save or borrow
during the default period. Third, bankruptcy cannot be declared two periods in a
row.11
In our experiments involving potential credit market changes we consider three
other potential costs of bankruptcy. The first is a utility cost of filing, χ. This
“stigma” may reflect real or psychic (“shame”) costs of bankruptcy. The second is
the “burning” of a fraction λ of filers’ consumption during the bankruptcy period.
This is meant to capture the increased cost of consumption (finding an apartment,
limited access to credit cards for purchases, etc.) after bankruptcy. Finally, we also
allow for a fixed cost φ of filing for bankruptcy, which captures the cost of filing and
legal fees.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, each household realizes
its productivity and expense shocks. If the household receives an expense shock,
then the debt of the household is increased (or savings decreased) by the amount
of the shock. The household then decides whether to file for bankruptcy or not. If
bankruptcy is declared, creditors garnishee labor income and the consumer is allowed
to spend the remaining income. Filers are not allowed to save or borrow, thus, they
consume all earnings net of garnishment (and “burning”). Households who do not
declare bankruptcy decide on their asset holdings for the following period and their
current consumption.
Financial Intermediaries
Financial markets are perfectly competitive. Intermediaries accept deposits from
savers and make loans to borrowers. The risk-free savings rate rs is given exogenously. Loans take the form of one period non-contingent bond contracts. However,
the bankruptcy option introduces a partial contingency by allowing bankrupts to discharge their debts. The face value of a loan to be repaid next period is denoted by d.
11

In our numerical experiments, each period lasts for 3 years, and households cannot file under
Chapter 7 more then once in each 6 year period.
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Savings are denoted by d < 0. Intermediaries incur a proportional transaction cost
of making loans, τ .
Intermediaries have complete information about borrowers: They observe the total
level of borrowing d0 , the current persistent productivity shock z, and the borrower’s
age j.12 This allows intermediaries to accurately forecast the default probability of a
borrower, θ(d0 , z, j), and price the loan accordingly.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, perfect competition and complete information imply that intermediaries make zero expected profit on each loan and that cross subsidization of interest
rates across different types of borrowers does not occur. Therefore the individual
bond price is determined by the default probability of the issuer and the risk-free
bond price. Without garnishment, without usury law and with full discharge of debt,
¡
¢
the zero profit condition is q b (d0 , z, j) = (1 − θ(d0 , z, j))q b , where q b = 1+r1s +τ is the
price of a bond with zero default probability.
For positive levels of garnishment, this formula needs to be adjusted. The unrestricted bond price under wage garnishment is
q ub (d0 , z, j) = (1 − θ(d0 , z, j))q b + θ(d0 , z, j)E(

d0

γy
)q b
+ κ0

(3.3)

) is the expected rate of recovery through garnishment, assuming that
where E( d0γy
+κ0
when a household defaults, the amount garnisheed is allocated proportionately to
expense debt and personal loans.
Lastly, taking into account the interest rate ceiling r̄, the equilibrium bond price is
(
1
q ub (d0 , z, j) if q ub (d0 , z, j) > 1+r̄
q b (d0 , z, j) =
(3.4)
0
otherwise
Households take the bond price schedule as given when making decisions. The
problem of a household is defined recursively using three distinct value functions.
V is the value of a “normal period,” while V̄ is the value of declaring bankruptcy.
Although bankruptcy cannot be declared two periods in a row, a household may
not be able to repay the realized value of an expense shock in a period following
bankruptcy. In this case, the household’s current income is garnisheed and its debt
12
The realizations of the transitory shock η and the expense shock κ do not contain any additional
information on the default risk.
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is rolled over at a fixed interest rate rr . The value of this state of the world is W .
The value functions are given by:
¸
· µ ¶
©
ª
c
0 0 0
0
0 0
Vj (d, z, η, κ) = max
u
+ βE max Vj+1 (d , z , η , κ ), V̄j+1 (z , η )
c,d0
nj
(3.5)
b 0
0
s.t. c + d + κ 6 ēj zη + q (d , z, j)d
µ
V̄j (z, η) = u

c
nj

¶
− χ + βE max {Vj+1 (0, z 0 , η 0 , κ0 ), Wj+1 (z 0 , η 0 , κ0 )}

(3.6)

s.t. c = (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(ēj zη − φ)
µ
Wj (z, η, κ) = u

c
nj

¶

©
ª
− χ + βE max Vj+1 (d0 , z 0 , η 0 , κ0 ), V̄j+1 (z 0 , η 0 )

s.t. c = (1 − λ)(1 − γ)ēj zη,

0

(3.7)

r

d = (κ − γēj zη)(1 + r )

An equilibrium is a set of value functions, optimal decision rules for the consumer,
default probabilities, and bond prices, such that equations (3.5)-(3.7) are satisfied,
and the bond prices are determined by the zero profit condition, taking the default
probabilities as given. The model can be solved numerically by backwards induction.

3.2

Benchmark Calibration

Our approach is to choose parameters to match the U.S. economy during 1995-99, and
then run experiments to match 1980-84 data (see Table 2). The description here will
be brief since we closely follow Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006). However, since
we are matching average data over 1995-99 instead of 1996 and have improved upon
our earlier measure of unsecured debt, our targets (and hence our parametrization)
differ slightly from our earlier work.
Households
Households live for 18 three-year periods. During the first 15 periods (ages 20-65)
households receive a stochastic endowment, while the last three periods correspond
to retirement in which households do not face any uncertainty. The period utility
1−σ
function is u(c) = c 1−σ−1 . We set the annual discount factor equal to 0.94 and the
degree of risk aversion σ equal to 2.13 Household size measured in equivalence units
is taken from Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006).
13

We have also investigated somewhat higher and lower degrees of risk aversion (σ = 1.5 and 2.5)
and found that our results are robust to this modification.
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The expense shocks are calibrated using data on expenses that are both unexpected and frequently cited by bankrupts as the proximate cause of their bankruptcy.
We consider three different sources of shocks: medical bills, divorces and unplanned
pregnancies. In our experiments, the expense shocks can take on three values:
κ ∈ {0, κ1 , κ2 }. To calibrate the medical expense shock, we utilize data from the
1996 and 1997 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) as well as the US Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA). MEPS provides detailed data on medical
expenses in 1996 and 1997 for a random sample of 19,859 persons (7,435 households).
We combine our estimate of these medical expense shocks with an estimate of the
cost of divorces and of the cost of an unplanned and unwanted child. Our calculations
generate one shock that is 26.4% of (one model period) average income in the economy while the other shock is equal to 82.18% of average income in the economy. The
probabilities of being hit by these shocks are 7.1% and 0.46%, respectively. A more
detailed discussion of our benchmark expense calibration is contained in Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2003).
A large literature has estimated the volatility of log earnings using the following
structure: log y i = log z i + log η i + log g(X i ), where g(X) captures the deterministic
component of earnings, and z and η ∼ N (0, ση2 ) are respectively persistent and transitory random components. The log of the persistent idiosyncratic shock follows an
i
AR(1) process, log zji = ρ log zj−1
+ ²ij , where ²ij ∼ N (0, σ²2 ). We set the benchmark
annual value of ρ = 0.95, σ²2 = 0.025 and ση2 = 0.05. These values are within the
range of values reported by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994), and Carroll and Samwick (1997). To feed these values into our
model, we first map the annual values into triennial numbers and then discretize the
idiosyncratic income shocks using the Tauchen method outlined in Adda and Cooper
(2003). The persistent shock is discretized as a five state Markov process, and the
productivity of an age 1 households is drawn from the stationary distribution. When
discretizing the transitory shock, we assume that 10% of the population receives a
positive (negative) transitory shock each period, and choose the value of the support
to match the variance.
We assume that the (exogenous) income of a retired household is the sum of two
parts: an autonomous income of 20% of average earnings in the economy and an
additional income of 35% of their own persistent earnings realization in the period
before retirement. This leads to a progressive retirement income system with an
average replacement rate of 55%, which is within the range of numbers reported in
Butrica, Iams, and Smith (2004). Note that total retirement income is higher as
14

households also have private savings.
Financial Market Parameters
The savings interest rate is set equal to 3.44%, which is the average real return on
municipal bonds for the U.S reported by Gourinchas and Parker (2002). The rollover
interest rate rr is set to 20% annual. The cost of filing for bankruptcy parameters —
the utility cost χ, the fixed cost φ, and the fraction of consumption lost λ — are set
to 0 in the benchmark economy.
The three remaining parameters — the garnishment rate γ, transaction cost τ , and
the interest rate ceiling r̄ — are chosen to match the facts from Table 2 for 1995-1999.
This leads to a γ of 0.319. The transactions cost of making loans is 2.56% annually.
Together with the risk-free savings interest rate of 3.44%, this implies an annual riskfree lending rate of 6%. Finally, the interest rate ceiling is set to a (high) value of
90% annually. While this value exceeds the current official interest rate ceilings, there
are many ways to (partially) get around the official legal ceilings.14 This ceiling is
not binding for almost all of the consumers in our experiments. However, having
no ceiling can sometimes lead to a (very) small number of people borrowing large
amounts at very high interest rates (with little intention to repaying them), which
leads to artificially high average interest rates.

4

Quantitative Evaluation of Different Stories

We now use the quantitative model to evaluate the various stories for the increase in
bankruptcies proposed in the literature. Since we calibrated the model to the 1995-99
period, we go backwards in our experiments and ask what changes in the quantitative
model can replicate the data from the “low filings” period 1980-84. In particular, we
use the observed changes in the debt ratio, the interest rate, and the charge-off rate
described in Table 2 to evaluate the plausibility of the different stories.
We first run experiments to analyze each proposed story individually. For each
story we ask whether the implied amount of borrowing, the interest rate and the
charge-off rate are consistent with the data for the low filing period (Table 2). The
first subsection focuses on uncertainty based stories, while the second subsection
examines credit market based stories. In Section 5, we ask whether a combination of
these stories can account for all key facts simultaneously.
14

Ceilings vary by state from 0 to 30 percent: See http://www.lectlaw.com/files/ban02.htm.

15

4.1

Did Increased Uncertainty Generate the Rise?

Surveys of bankrupts find that most bankruptcies are triggered by negative shocks
to earnings or unexpected “expenses”.15 An increase in the probability or size of
these adverse shocks could potentially play an important role in accounting for the
rise in filings. Similarly, it has been argued that increased income uncertainty plays
a role in the rise of consumer bankruptcies (Warren and Warren Tyagi (2003)). In
this section, we document the extent to which uncertainty has changed over the last
two decades and use our model to assess the quantitative importance of increased
earnings uncertainty and increased “expense” risks. We also argue that demographic
changes are unlikely to have played a large role in the rise.
4.1.1

“Expense Shocks”

Before assessing the extent to which expense uncertainty has changed in the data, we
use our model to ask how large a decrease is required to reduce bankruptcy rates to the
1980 level. Since our model has 4 parameters describing the expense shocks (two shock
sizes and two probabilities) there is not a unique way to decrease expense uncertainty.
One way of bringing bankruptcies down to their 1980 level is to eliminate the small
expense shock entirely, which is reported as experiment 2 in Table 3. Note, however,
that this hardly affects the debt/gdp ratio, which is counterfactual. Eliminating the
large expense shock instead has a much smaller impact, decreasing bankruptcies to
0.75% (see experiment 3).
Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that an increase in expense shocks alone cannot
explain the U.S. experience from 1980 to 2000, as it counter-factually implies little
change in the consumer debt to income ratio. However, increased expense uncertainty
may have contributed to the rise in bankruptcy in combination with other factors.
To assess the contribution of increased expense uncertainty we need to estimate the
change in expense uncertainty over the last two decades.
Medical Shocks
Health care spending has been increasing rapidly in most developed countries. In
the U.S. total health expenditures have increased from $247 billion in 1980 to $1,149
billion in 1998. Relevant for this paper are medical costs born directly by households,
net of insurance premia.16 Real out-of-pocket (oop) payments per households have
15
16

See for example Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000), Figure 1.2.
Insurance premia are regular payments and are hardly unexpected.
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Table 3: Changes in Expense Uncertainty

1

2
3
4

Experiment

Ch. 7
Filings

Avg. rb

Charge-off
Rate

Debt
Earnings

Benchmark

0.83%

12.05 %

5.4%

9.20%

U.S. 1995-99

0.83%

10.93 - 12.84%

4.6%

9%

U.S. 1980-84

0.25%

10.95 - 12.05%

1.9%

5%

no small shock
no large shock
15% decrease

0.25%
0.75%
0.73%

8.20%
11.88%
11.48%

2.04%
5.2%
4.9%

9.77%
9.21%
9.27%

increased from $1,477 in 1980 to $1,946 in 1998, a 32% increase.17 However, oop
payments as a fraction of median household income has only increased from 3.55% in
1980 to 4.16% in 1998. That is, in 1980, the fraction of median income spent on oop
was 15% lower than in 1998. The percentage of Americans without health insurance
has also increased. In 1982, 13.6% of Americans had no health insurance, compared
to 16.3% in 1998, an increase of 17 percent.18 This leads us to believe that rather
than individuals paying higher amounts in 1998 compared to 1980, there are more
people with large out-of-pocket expenditures. Furthermore, (based on unreported
experiments), the bankruptcy filing rate in the model is more sensitive to changes
in the probability of the shock than its size. Thus, decreasing the expense shock
probabilities by 15% should yield an upper bound on how much of the change in
filing rate could come through this channel.19 Based on the result of the experiment
4 in Table 3, we conclude that the increase in medical shocks accounts for less than 20
percent of the increase in consumer bankruptcies, and cannot account for the increase
in consumer debt. Given that defaults do not change much, it is not surprising that
this experiment cannot replicate the large increase in charge-offs either.
The comparison with Canada casts further doubt on changes in medical uncertainty
17
These numbers are from the U.S. Statistical Abstracts (2000), Table 151. The increase in oop
expenditures reported by Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2005) is even lower, so we
interpret our numbers as an upper bound.
18
These figures may underestimate the change in health insurance coverage, as a change in the
way in which health insurance data was collected after 1987 led to an increase in the fraction of the
population reporting health insurance coverage.
19
This is likely an overestimate, as part of the expense shock is due to family shocks which have
changed little over this period (see below).
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being the main driving force behind the rise in filings. Canada is a country with
universal health care coverage. Hence, catastrophic medical expenses are unlikely
to be the main cause of bankruptcies in Canada, which is consistent with the lower
level of bankruptcies relative to the U.S. However, Canada experienced a very similar
increase in bankruptcies (see Figure 1), which suggests that a factor common to both
countries is primarily responsible. This leads us to conclude that changes in the cost
and extent of insurance against catastrophic medical events are not the primary factor
driving the rise in bankruptcies.
Family Shocks
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) emphasize the importance of unexpected
family-related events for bankruptcy. In their 1991 bankruptcy survey, 22% of respondents cited family factors as a main cause of their bankruptcy. The obvious two
causes for sudden expenses related to family are divorces and unplanned pregnancies.
Has uncertainty regarding these family events gone up and is this responsible for
the increase in bankruptcies? We find that the answer to the first question is no.
The number of births has decreased slightly from 15.9 per 1,000 population to 14.3
(see Table 4). The fraction of births that were intended has gone up from 61.9%
in 1982 to 69% in 1995. On the other hand, births to unmarried women have gone
up by almost 50%. However, since unintended births have declined, it seems hard
to interpret the births by unmarried women as an increase in unplanned events.
Moreover, births to other demographic groups typically associated with unplanned
pregnancies (like the teenage birth rate) have declined slightly since 1980. Similarly,
the divorce rates has declined, from 5.2 per 1,000 population in 1980 to 4.3 in 1998.
The fact that divorce rates have stopped rising in the last two decades of the 20th
century is well-documented in the literature (e.g. Goldstein (1999)).20 While the
number of divorced (and not remarried) people has increased, new divorces rather
than the stock of divorced people is the relevant measure of uncertainty. Overall, this
seems to imply that, if there was any change at all, “demographic uncertainty” has
declined during the last two decades. We therefore conclude that family uncertainty
did not play an important direct role in the rising bankruptcy rate.
20

Goldstein (1999) also shows that the decrease in the divorce rate is not simply driven by the
rise of cohabitation and the higher break-up rates for cohabiting couples.
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Table 4: Births and Divorces
U.S.
1980
1998
Births per 1,000 population
15.9
14.3
Births per 1,000 women aged 15-44
68.4
64.3
∗
Intended Births
61.9%
69%
Births per 1,000 unmarried women
29.4
43.3
Births per 1,000 teenagers (15-19 yrs old)
53.0
50.3
Divorces per 1,000 population
5.2
4.3
∗
Intended birth numbers are for 1982 and 1995 respectively.
Source: U.S. Statistical Abstract, various years.
4.1.2

Demographic Changes

Average family size declined dramatically between the early 1980s and late 1990s.
While a proportional fall in family size across all ages has no effect in our model, a shift
in the slope of the family size profile could affect bankruptcies by shifting households’
desired lifetime consumption and borrowing profile. In the data, the family size profile
has become slightly flatter as the fall in average family size has been largest for young
people, while average family size for ages 57 and older has remained roughly constant.
In our experiments we find that this has a small quantitative impact on bankruptcies
and borrowing, and goes in the wrong direction. An average family size profile that
is larger for the young and almost identical for older people effectively makes the
life-cycle earnings profile steeper. This means people borrow more when young, and
hence are more vulnerable to shocks.
We now briefly discuss two additional demographic stories: changes in the age
composition and marital status of the U.S. population. These changes cannot be
evaluated using our model as we do not distinguish between different types of households (single vs. married) nor do we allow changes in cohort size. However, some
back-of-the envelope calculations suggest that these are not important contributors
to the increase in consumer bankruptcies.
Table 5 shows that bankruptcy filing rates are a hump-shaped function of age.
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) argue that the aging of the baby-boomers
through the high risk age groups accounts for 18% of the increase in bankruptcies between 1981 and 1991. We redid their analysis and constructed the implied bankruptcy
rates between 1980 and 2001, holding age specific filings rates constant at their 1991
19

and 2001 levels respectively. Figure 5 contrasts the constructed filings rates per 1,000
households with the actual numbers. The graph shows that changes in the age structure alone had no impact on the aggregate filings rates. The discrepancy between
our results and Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) is due to the distinction between an increase in total filings and filings per 1,000 population. The total number
of bankruptcies increases because the U.S. population grew by 17% between 1981 and
1991, but this is unrelated to changes in age composition.

Table 5: Filings per 1,000 adults by age in the U.S.
Age < 25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 + avg.
1991 3.4
6.8
6.5
5.2
2.7
0.6
4.6
2001 3.8
8.9
9.8
8.1
4.1
2.0
6.6
Source: Sullivan, Thorne, and Warren (2001), Table 1 (primary petitioners only).21

The second change is the dramatic rise in the share of bankruptcies filed by
women.22 The percentage of bankruptcies filed by women has increased from less
than 15% in 1967 to almost 40% in 1999. However, filing rates by gender are hard to
interpret. Married couples can choose to file jointly, separately, or only one spouse
could file. Therefore, the link between increases in the filing rate of women and the
increased number of single women is not obvious. Filing rates by marital status are
more meaningful in this context. Unfortunately, marital status data is not routinely
collected by bankruptcy courts. Some evidence comes from Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook (2000), who asked about marital status in their 1991 survey of bankrupts.
Table 6 shows that a higher fraction of singles and especially of divorced people file for
bankruptcy compared to married people. Since the fraction of singles and divorcees
has increased substantially during the last two decades, it seems plausible that these
demographic changes are in part responsible for the trend in bankruptcies.
In 1980, 7.4% of American adults age 25 and older were divorced and 4.7% were
never married. In 1998, these numbers increased to 11% and 14.1% respectively. Since
the filing rate for divorced people is roughly triple the filing rate for married people,
small changes in the number of divorced people can potentially lead to large increases
in bankruptcy rates. To evaluate this story, we construct an aggregate bankruptcy
rate for all years between 1980 and 2000 based solely on changes in the fraction of
21

These filing rates are slightly different from the ones we use in the paper as they include Chapter
13 filings.
22
See Sullivan and Warren (1999) and Pollak (1997).

20

Table 6: Filings by Marital Status in the U.S. (1991)
marital status
filings per 1,000 persons
currently married 4.2
never married
7.07
widowed
1.92
divorced
11.97
Source: Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000)

people of each marital status, holding marital status specific filing rates constant.
The results can be seen in Figure 6. Changes in the marital composition of the U.S.
can account for a modest increase from 4.7 bankruptcies per 1,000 in 1980 to 5.3 in
2001. This is a small fraction of the actual increase from 2.2 in 1980 to 7.9 in 2001.23
4.1.3

Income Uncertainty

There is a broad consensus that the variance of log earnings has increased in the U.S.
from the late 70s to the early 90s and then decreased substantially again by the mid
90s (Moffitt and Gottschalf (2002), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2005)). For example, Moffitt and Gottschalf (2002) report that the
variance of log earnings roughly doubled between 1980 and 1992, but fell again by
about a third between 1991 and 1996. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) report a more
modest increase in the variance of log earnings.
As we know from the analysis in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006), persistent
and transitory income shocks have very different implications for bankruptcy filings.
There is, however, much less consensus about the relative importance of the permanent, persistent, and transitory components in accounting for the increased variance
of log earnings. Moffitt and Gottschalf (2002) argue that the variance of the permanent shock increased by roughly 50 percent between 1980 and 1996, while the variance
of transitory shocks doubled from 1980 to 1985, leveled off until about 1992, after
which it declined sharply by about 50 percent. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), on the
other hand, find a sharp increase in the variance of the permanent shock between the
mid 70s and 1985, after which it fell and by 1987 was back to its 1978 level. Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Preston (2005) find that the variance of the permanent shock doubled
23

One caveat is in order here. We cannot rule out a combination of more singles together with
increased uncertainty particularly for singles.
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between 1980 and 1985, then declined, and that the transitory variance increased
by roughly 50 percent from 1980 to 1987, followed by a fall. Finally, Heathcoate,
Storesletten, and Violante (2004) analyze log hourly wages, rather than earnings,
and decompose them into permanent, persistent, and transitory components for the
years 1967 to 1996. Their estimates imply that the variance of the transitory shock
increased by 25 to 30 percent (depending on which years one uses), while the variance
of the persistent shock remained constant or decreased slightly.
In the experiments we run, we take the most generous estimates of the increase in
persistent and transitory income uncertainty to get an upper bound on the impact of
income uncertainty. We investigate an increase in the variance of the transitory shock
in excess of 30%. Since we do not have permanent shocks in the model, we increase
the variance of persistent shocks to represent possible increases in both persistent and
permanent uncertainty in the data. To obtain an upper bound on the impact of these
shocks, we increase the variance of the persistent shock by 150%. We then shut down
the income shocks completely to show that income uncertainty cannot account for a
large part of the rise in filings. The results are reported in Table 7.
Table 7: Changes in Income Uncertainty (1995-99 Benchmark)
Experiment

ση2

σ²2

Ch. 7
Filings

Avg. rb

Charge-off
Rate

Debt
Earnings

Benchmark

0.05

0.025

0.83%

12.05%

5.4%

9.20%

U.S. 1995-99

0.83%

10.93-12.84%

4.6%

9%

U.S. 1980-84

0.25%

10.95-12.05%

1.9%

5%

1
2

Transitory 1
Transitory 2

0.0375
0

0.025
0.025

0.838%
0.831%

11.66%
9.31%

5.1%
3.0%

9.79%
12.26%

3
4
5

Persistent 1
Persistent 2
Persistent 3

0.05
0.05
0.05

0.01
0.004
0

0.802%
0.783%
0.676%

8.85%
7.53%
6.99%

2.6%
1.4%
0.9%

14.88%
20.88%
27.48%

6
7

ρ = 0.98
ρ = 0.98

0.05
0.05

0.025
0.01

0.939%
0.851%

17.28%
8.81%

9.6%
2.6%

4.82%
10.58%

8

No inc. risk

0

0

1.182%

7.26%

1.2%

51.01%

Experiment 1 shows that lowering the variance of the transitory income shocks
by 25% (i.e., a 33% increase over the two decades) has almost no effect – in fact,
22

it slightly increases the filings. Experiment 2 illustrates that even shutting down
transitory income shocks completely does not change the number of filings. This
strongly suggests that a change in transitory income uncertainty cannot be a driving
force behind the increase in bankruptcy filings.
In experiment 3, we lower the variance of the persistent shocks by 60% (corresponding to a 2.5-fold increase over the two decades). This decline in the variance
decreases the filings to 0.802%, while driving the unsecured debt up to almost 15%
of earnings. Experiment 4 shows that lowering the variance of the persistent shocks
by another 60% only reduces filings to 0.78%. Finally, shutting down persistent
shocks completely only reduces filings to 0.68%, while driving the debt-income ratio
up to 27.5 percent. Thus, changes in the variance of persistent income shocks cannot quantitatively account for the rise in filings, and generate counterfactual changes
in unsecured debt. However, shutting down all income uncertainty leads to a large
increase in filings (see Experiment 8), which is driven by the dramatic rise in the
debt-income ratio to 51 percent.
The recent literature on turbulence (e.g., Kambourov and Manovskii (2004)) suggests that, perhaps, the persistence of income has gone down over the last few decades.
Experiments 6 and 7 in Table 7 show little promise in explaining the rise in bankruptcies through this channel. Increasing the persistence without adjusting the variance
of the shocks actually increases the number of filings due to more compressed income
distribution under the lower persistence (see experiment 6). Adjusting the variance,
to produce the same income dispersion as in the benchmark, brings the number of
filings right back to the benchmark level.
To summarize, changes in transitory income shocks have almost no effect, changes
in persistence generate small changes in the wrong direction, and changes in the
variance of persistent shocks have a quantitatively small effect on the filings and
large effect (in the wrong direction) on debt.
One might suspect that the unresponsiveness of bankruptcies to changes in income
uncertainty is artificial since most bankruptcies in the benchmark economy are driven
by expense shocks. To check the robustness of these results, we calibrated the model
to 1980-84 and then asked whether an increase in income uncertainty can lead to
an increase in bankruptcies. We find that our results are robust to this “reverse
experiment.” Details on these experiments are reported in Appendix C.
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4.2

Changes in the Consumer Credit Markets Environment

In this section, we consider three channels related to the credit market environment:
a fall in the cost of bankruptcy, the abolishment of usury laws, and a fall in the
transaction cost of making loans.
4.2.1

A Decline in the Cost of Bankruptcy

A common explanation of the rise of bankruptcies is that bankruptcy has become less
costly to bankrupts and hence more attractive (Gross and Souleles (2002), Zywicki
(2005)). A decline in the cost of filing can mean a variety of different things. Several
studies argue that a change in social norms leading to a decline in social “stigma”
associated with bankruptcy is responsible for the soaring bankruptcies (Buckley and
Brinig (1998), Fay, Hurst, and White (2002)).24 Alternatively, legal changes, such as
the 1978 bankruptcy amendments, may have made filing for bankruptcy easier and
thereby reduced the cost of filing (Shepard (1984)). The overall cost of bankruptcy
may have also fallen due to the reduced cost of accessing credit after bankruptcy
(Staten (1993)).
The idea behind all of these stories is simple: a decline in the cost of filing increases
the value of filing for any level of debt and income. We consider three different ways
of introducing bankruptcy costs in the model to investigate the plausibility of this
class of stories. First, we consider a utility cost associated with an individual filing
for bankruptcy, χ. Although this most closely captures the idea of a decline in social
“stigma”, it can also be interpreted as a reduced form way of introducing real costs
associated with filing for bankruptcy. The second mechanism we consider is a cost that
is proportional to consumption in the bankruptcy period which we term “burning”.
This is motivated by reports that bankrupts face increased transaction costs when
purchasing goods. Finally, we consider the possibility that the fixed cost of filing for
bankruptcy has fallen. This corresponds directly to a decline in filing fees caused by
legal changes or a reduction in the cost of acquiring information about bankruptcy
due to increased advertising by lawyers.
Since there is no direct measures of these bankruptcy costs, we use the model to
back out how large a change in each of these costs individually is required to reduce
filings to the early 80s level (holding all other parameters fixed and assuming each
24

This explanation is also common among non academics. For example, Alan Greenspan argued
that “Personal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their sense of shame.”
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of these costs equaled zero in the late 1990s). The results are reported in rows 2a,
2b, and 2c of Table 8. It is worth noting that the costs are significant. The value of
stigma required to match the 1980-1984 filing level corresponds to the ex-ante utility
loss from a reduction in the life-time consumption stream of roughly 11.5% in the
benchmark economy. The burning experiment involves a consumption tax of 31% of
the bankrupts consumption during the (3-year) period they file. The fixed cost of
filing is 12% of the (3-year) average household income, which corresponds to roughly
$15, 000 in 1998 dollars.
Our numerical results show that while it is possible to generate the observed rise
in bankruptcies simply by changing the cost of bankruptcy, this comes at the cost
of several counterfactual implications. First, a decline in bankruptcy costs implies
that the level of borrowing should have also declined by a large amount, and that
the average borrowing interest rate should have increased. Both of these implications
are counterfactual. In addition, the experiments generate a decline in the average
debt to income ratio of bankrupts over the past twenty years, while there has been
an increase in this ratio in the data (see Section 2.2). These results are very robust
to our three different ways of modelling bankruptcy costs, as all three have almost
identical implications for the change in the debt/gdp ratio, the average borrowing
interest rate and charge-offs. These counterfactual implications lead us to conclude
that a decline in the cost of bankruptcies by itself is not the whole story.
It is important to point out one caveat. The relationship between the cost of filing
and the level of borrowing is not monotonic, since at very high levels a decline in the
cost may lead to higher borrowing. As a result, it is possible to construct examples
where a decline in the cost of filing leads to an increase in the debt-income ratio.
However, this does not occur at our calibrated parameters, and the numerical results
reported are robust to various sensitivity exercises we have conducted.
The 1978 Amendments to Bankruptcy Law
One potential explanation for a decrease in the cost of bankruptcy is legal reform.
Indeed, several authors have argued that the 1978 amendments (which came into
effect in October, 1979) to the U.S. bankruptcy code played a key role in the rise of
consumer bankruptcies by making bankruptcy more attractive to some households by
increasing the value of exempt assets and permitting joint filing by spouses (McKinley
(1997), Boyes and Faith (1986), Shepard (1984)). These amendments also coincided
with a 1977 U.S. Supreme Court decision which removed restrictions on advertising by
lawyers, which may have reduced the cost of acquiring information about bankruptcy
25

Table 8: Changes in Credit Market Environment
Experiment

Ch. 7
Filings

Avg. rb

Charge-off
Rate

Debt
Earnings

Benchmark

0.83%

12.05 %

5.4%

9.20%

U.S. 1995-99

0.83%

10.93 - 12.84%

4.6%

9%

U.S. 1980-84

0.25%

10.95 - 12.05%

1.9%

5%

2a
2b
2c

Stigma (χ) ↑
Burning ↑
Fixed cost ↑

0.25%
0.25%
0.25%

7.04%
7.04%
7.02%

0.97%
0.98%
0.95%

14.00%
14.69%
12.54%

3a
3b
3c

r̄ = 10%
r̄ = 8%
r̄ = 7%

0.68%
0.66%
0.54%

7.48 %
7.43%
6.77%

1.38%
1.33%
0.72%

9.12%
8.99%
1.12%

4a
4b
4c

τ = 3.56%
τ = 4.56%
τ = 5.56%

0.81%
0.79%
0.78%

14.61%
16.99%
19.24%

6.64%
7.67%
8.59%

7.65%
6.33%
5.26%

1

(McKinley (1997)). Given that one can interpret these changes as a decline in the
cost of filing, our experiments suggest that legal changes alone are not a complete
explanation of the rise in filings. There are also three additional reasons that cast
doubt on the importance of legal changes as an explanation of the rise in filings. First,
as Moss and Johnson (1999) point out, the U.S. reforms were relatively minor. Second,
Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) analyze data on the characteristics of bankrupts before
and after the 1978 amendments, and conclude that the amendments did not play a
significant role for the rise in consumer bankruptcies. Finally, there were no changes
to the bankruptcy law in Canada in the 1980s and early 1990s, during which filings
rates increased dramatically in a similar fashion to the United States.25
25

There are two caveats. First, there were potentially important administrative changes that may
have increased access to the bankruptcy system for low income households during the 1970s. Second,
the flattening of Canadian bankruptcy filings after the tightening of the code in 1997 suggest that
legislative changes can have a significant impact upon filings (Ziegel (1997)).
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4.2.2

Usury Laws

Until the late 1970’s, most states imposed (tight) ceilings on nominal interest rates
for consumer loans. These laws were substantially relaxed in the early 1980s as a result of the Supreme court decision involving Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis
v. First Omaha Service Corporation, 439 US 299 (1978) which permitted banks in
Nebraska to offer loans to residents of Minnesota at rates in excess of the maximum
allowed under Minnesota legislation. This ruling effectively removed the ability of
individual states to regulate interest rates of lenders located in other states. Subsequently, large credit card issuers relocated to states (notably Delaware and North
Dakota) with the highest interest rate ceiling (Evans and Schmalnsee (1999)). This
was followed by a rapid growth in high interest rate credit card debt, which coincided
with the rise in consumer bankruptcies. This has led some to suggest that the relaxation of interest rate ceilings contributed to the rise in bankruptcy by facilitating the
expansion of credit to riskier borrowers.
We conduct numerical experiments to analyze the implications of this story for
bankruptcies and consumer borrowing. We report the results in Table 8 for three
alternative ceilings, all of which lie below the average borrowing interest rate in the
benchmark economy and above the risk-free lending rate of 6% (experiments 3a-3c).
Even a very tight interest rate ceiling of 7% can account for only about half of the
rise in filings. This result is driven by the fact that bankruptcies in the model are
caused by bad realizations of expense and income uncertainty. A tight borrowing
constraint dramatically reduces borrowing (by preventing the extension of credit to
“risky” borrowers and placing tight restrictions on the amount that can be borrowed).
The lower level of borrowing in turn reduces the incentive for households to default in
response to bad realizations of expense and income shocks. Offsetting this is the fact
that tight borrowing constraints associated with low interest rate ceilings significantly
limits households ability to borrow to smooth negative income and expense shocks.
This in turn pushes some households who would not have defaulted in the absence of
the low interest rate ceiling to default. This limits the effect of interest rate ceilings
on defaults.
The numerical experiments indicate that the interest rate deregulation story is not
consistent with the other credit market facts. While a relaxation of the ceiling is
consistent with a rise in the debt-income ratio, it also implies a substantial increase
in the average borrowing interest rates. In the data, however, there appears to be
little change in the average borrowing interest rate.
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There are two additional observations which cast some doubt on the importance
of usury laws. First, as pointed out by Ellis (1998), Canada has also experienced a
rapid rise in consumer bankruptcies but did not experience a deregulation of credit
markets around the same time.26 Second, it is unclear whether interest rate ceilings
were effectively binding in the United States. Peterson (1983) argues that one way
around interest rate ceilings is for the seller of a good to sell at a higher price on credit.
He examines data from 1979 for four states with different interest rate ceilings, and
finds that the state with the lowest ceiling (Arkansas) had a higher share of installment
credit offered directly by retailers than borrowers in the other states. This argument
is consistent with the observed shift of credit away from store based to general purpose
lending after the removal of interest rate ceilings.
Our conclusion is that while the Marquette decision may have contributed indirectly to the rise in bankruptcy by permitting continued lending to high risk consumers, it was not in itself a significant cause of the rise in filings.
4.2.3

Decline in Lending Costs

The past thirty years have witnessed substantial credit market innovations which are
frequently cited as playing a key role in the rapid spread of credit cards (Evans and
Schmalnsee (1999)) as well as a rapid increase in the “sub-prime” credit market, which
provides credit to high risk consumers. Many of these changes have been driven by
the rapid improvements in information technology, which has led to large increases
in information sharing and reduced the cost of processing information (Barron and
Staten (2003)). In this section, we explore one avenue through which these financial
innovations could impact consumer borrowing: a reduction in the transaction cost of
borrowing (Berger (2003)).
We report the results for three experiments in rows 4a-4c in Table 8. Experiments
4a, 4b, 4c involve an increase in the transaction cost of lending of one, two, and
three percentage points, respectively. Surprisingly, none of these changes have a
significant effect on filings. However, variations in the transaction cost of lending
have a large effect upon the average borrowing interest rate, the charge-off rate, and
aggregate borrowing. For all three experiments, the increase in average borrowing
interest rates exceeds the increase in the risk-free borrowing interest rate. This is
26
Interest rate ceilings on bank loans were formally removed in Canada through the Bank Act of
1967, although these ceilings were largely ineffective, as borrowers were free to “voluntarily” agree to
pay higher interest rates in the form of an upfront charge at the time of the loan (Scholnick (2000)).
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due to the fact that lower risk households reduce their borrowing, which leads to
an increase in the average risk premium on lending. It is also worth noting that a
decrease of roughly three percentage points in the transactions cost is consistent with
the observed increase in borrowing.
Our experiments lead us to conclude that a reduction in the transactions cost of
lending alone cannot account for the rise in filings. However, it may play an important
role in accounting for the rise in borrowing.

5

Can a Combination of Stories Match the Data?

Our conclusion from Section 4 is that none of the stories individually can generate
a substantial rise in bankruptcy while matching the observed changes in borrowing,
the interest rate, and charge-offs. We now analyze whether a combination of stories
can match the data.
The combination we choose is guided by our earlier results, and is a combination of
both uncertainty and credit market stories. We incorporate two uncertainty stories:
an increase in expense uncertainty and an increase in transitory income uncertainty. A
reasonable upper bound on the change in expense uncertainty is that the probabilities
in the early 1980s were roughly 85% of the late 1990s. In our experiment, we thus scale
down the benchmark probabilities of expense shocks by 0.85. To capture changes in
income volatility, we scale down the variance of the transitory shock by 25% (which is
at the upper limit of the values suggested by Heathcoate, Storesletten, and Violante
(2004)). Given these changes, we choose the values of the cost of bankruptcy and the
transaction cost of borrowing so as to match filings and the debt-income ratio in the
early 1980s.
The results of increasing the stigma cost are reported in the experiment 2 of Table
9. In this experiment, the transaction cost is increased by 4.15% (to 6.71% from
2.56%), while the stigma parameter is set equal to slightly less than half of its value
in the stigma only experiment reported in Table 8. This combination experiment
closely replicates the level of filings, the average borrowing interest rate and the
debt-to-earnings ratio observed in the early 1980s. The model also predicts a sizable
increase in the charge-off rate from the 1980s to the late 1990s in line with the data:
an increase from 1.3% to 5.4% in the model, compared to a slightly lower increase in
the data, from 1.9% to 4.6%.
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The success of this experiment is driven primarily by two credit market variables:
the decline in the cost of bankruptcy and the transaction cost of lending. This can be
seen from experiments 3 - 6 of Table 9, where the results of dropping each of the four
changes from the stigma combination experiment are reported. These experiments
show that the increase in expense and transitory income uncertainty play a small role
along all dimensions. The main factor in the rise in filings is the decline in the costs of
filing (modelled as stigma in this experiment), which accounts for roughly 75% of the
rise in filings. In contrast, the decline in the transaction cost has a very small effect
on filings, but counteracts the increase in interest rates and the decline in borrowing
predicted by the decline in stigma.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The reduction in the cost of filing makes
bankruptcy more attractive which decreases the bond price schedule (i.e. interest
rates are higher for any level of borrowing). This leads to a decline in borrowing and
an increase in average borrowing interest rates (compare experiments 2 and 4 in Table
9). The fact that a decline in the transactions costs of lending can offset the changes
in interest rates and borrowing is not obvious. The direct effect of a lower τ is to
increase the bond price schedule, thereby increasing desired borrowing by households.
The lower interest rate schedule reduces the cost of repaying one’s loans for any level
of debt, which increases the value of repaying relative to the value of bankruptcy. The
lower interest rate schedule also increases the cost of being excluded from borrowing
during the bankruptcy period. The overall effect is to increase both the fraction of
young households who borrow and the amount borrowed by borrowers. Together,
these forces significantly increase borrowing while lowering the incentive to default
for a given level of borrowing. As a result, the realized average default rate is only
slightly changed compared to the experiment without the transactions cost increase.
These experiments reinforce our interpretation of the earlier results that none of
the stories can individually account for the rise in bankruptcies. Instead, it leads us to
conclude that a combination of these types of credit market changes is largely responsible for the rise in filings: Credit market innovations have both made bankruptcy
more attractive and reduced the cost of lending.
Experiments 7 and 8 of Table 9 report the results for the two alternative bankruptcy
costs: burning and the fixed costs of filing. As in section 4.2.1, these experiments
indicate that the implications for the aggregate variables of a reduction in the cost of
bankruptcy are robust to alternative specifications of the cost. However, the implications of these types of costs do differ in terms of their implications for the change in
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Experiment
1

Table 9: Combination of Stories
Ch. 7
Avg. rb
Charge-off
Filings
Rate

Debt
Earnings

Benchmark

0.83%

12.05 %

5.4%

9.20%

U.S. 1995-99

0.83%

10.93 - 12.84%

4.6%

9%

U.S. 1980-84

0.25%

10.95 - 12.05%

1.9%

5.0%

2
3
4
5
6

Stigma, all, see text
No ∆ Expense
No ∆ Stigma
No ∆ τ
No ∆ Trans. Income

0.25%
0.30%
0.64%
0.31%
0.26%

11.66%
11.856%
19.37%
7.06%
11.71 %

1.3%
1.4%
7.6%
1.0%
1.2%

5.05%
4.99%
4.22%
13.64%
4.89%

7

Burn, all, see text

0.25%

11.38%

1.1%

5.20%

8

Fixed Cost, all, see text

0.25%

11.42%

1.05%

5.02%

the average debt-to-income ratio of bankrupts. Both the burning and the fixed cost
experiments generate an increase in the average debt-to-income ratio of bankrupts,
while the stigma experiment predicts a small decline. This suggests that with better
data on changes in the characteristics of bankrupts over time, one could potentially
attempt to better identify the nature of the changes in bankruptcy costs.
As a further test of the plausibility of this conclusion, we also examined the implications of our experiments for household savings. The combination experiments
generate a fall in savings relative to income. The implied decline in net worth in
experiment 2 of Table 9 between the early 1980s and the late 1990s is roughly 6%.
About one third of the decline in net worth in the model is due to increased debt,
while the rest is driven by a reduction in assets held for precautionary reasons. The
increased attractiveness of borrowing (caused by the fall in τ ) and the reduced cost
of bankruptcy lower the value of precautionary savings to households.
This fall is qualitatively consistent with the well documented decline in the private
savings rate in the U.S. over the last several decades (Gale and Sabelhaus (1999)).
The ratio of median net worth relative to median income fell by roughly 25%, from
1.24 in 1984 to 0.89 by 1998.27 This suggests that the credit market changes explored
27

We look at median rather than average net worth since the upper tail of the income distribution accounts for a significant share of average asset holdings, and our numerical experiments
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in our paper could have played a significant role in the reduction of savings observed
in the U.S.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate the extent to which the six most commonly
offered explanations of the rise in bankruptcies can account for the rise in filings, the
observed increase in unsecured consumer debt relative to disposable income, the lack
of change in average borrowing interest rates, and the rise in charge-off rates. Our
first finding is a negative one. Our results suggest that none of the stories we consider
can individually account for the rise in consumer bankruptcies and changes in credit
markets. Our second finding is a positive one. A combination of four of these stories
does a very good job of accounting for the key facts. Our experiments suggest that
the most important of these factors are related to changes in credit markets. Indeed,
our paper suggests that a reduction in the cost (the “stigma”?) of bankruptcy and
a reduction in the transactions cost of lending play an essential role in the rise of
bankruptcies and unsecured consumer borrowing.
These results are different from various papers which have argued for a monocausal
explanation of the rise. The spirit of our results are close to those of Athreya (2004)
and Moss and Johnson (1999), in that we view credit market changes as playing
the key role in the rise. However, our results suggest that a decline in the cost of
bankruptcy plays a much more important role in the rise than these papers would
suggest. Of course, this finding leaves open the question of what exactly has caused
the decline in the cost of bankruptcy. We believe that endogenizing these bankruptcy
costs is an important challenge for future research. One hypothesis is that this cost
has declined because of the reduced cost of accessing credit markets after bankruptcy
– a story documented by Staten (1993). This could be due to improved forecasting of
a person’s bankruptcy risk caused by technological innovation in the financial sector.
With little information about a debtors “type,” bankruptcy is an important signal to
the creditor about future default risk. However, if banks have full information about
a creditor ex-ante, then bankruptcy is simply an instance of bad luck and does not
do not have income realizations which would correspond to the top of the income distribution in
the data. Net worth is based on data from SIPP as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, see
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth/detailed tables.html. Median income is from the Report
of the President, see http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy01/sheets/b 31.xls.
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contain further information about a person’s type, in which case, bankruptcy should
not increase the person’s cost of borrowing. We therefore believe that further work
along the lines of Chatterjee, Corbae, and Rios-Rull (2006) is important to improve
our understanding of the working of consumer credit markets.
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A

Figures

Figure 1: Bankrupts per 1000 18-64.
U.S. Consumer bankruptcies are the sum of non-business Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 filings. The data from 1979 and before is from Table 1 of McKinley (1997), while
the number of filings from 1980 to 2004 are from the ABI website. The denominator
is the estimate of the U.S. population between the ages of 18 and 64 as of July 1.
Canada: Consumer Bankruptcies plus consumer proposals. The numerator is the
total number of bankruptcy petitions filed. Joint filing is permitted when two people
have interrelated finances, so this may understate the total number of bankrupts.
Figures 2 and 3: Debt as % of Disposable Income
Total debt is the summation of mortgage debt and consumer debt. Mortgage
debt is from the Flow of Funds of Account, Table D.3. The mortgage data gives the
end of period balance outstanding quarterly, and has been converted to annual by
averaging. Consumer credit is the summation of revolving and nonrevolving consumer
credit balances outstanding reported in G.19. The original data was monthly, and was
converted to annual by averaging. The data we report is based on the 2004 revision
and includes student loans outstanding in nonrevolving credit. Personal disposable
income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.1. Personal Income and Its
Disposition [Billions of dollars].
The unsecured credit measure in Figure 3 over 1983-1999 was constructed as follows. Before 1999, G.19 reported consumer credit in the following three categories: revolving, automobile (non-revolving) and other nonrevolving (after 1999, G.19 reports
consumer credit as either revolving or nonrevolving, which is why our constructed
series ends in 1999). To estimate unsecured consumer credit, we: (1) Constructed
a non-automobile non-revolving debt measure by subtracting the automobile debt
series from the updated non-revolving series (this series contains student loans issued
by the federal government); (2) Used linear extrapolation to construct a measure of
the fraction of non-auto non-revolving debt that is personal using the values reported
by Dynan, Johnson, and Pence (2003) from the SCF for 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995 and
1998; and (3) Finally, we construct our measure of unsecured consumer credit by
summing: revolving + non-auto non-revolving * fraction personal.
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B

Surveys of Bankrupts

While there are several empirical studies of U.S. bankrupts, one must be careful in
comparing them due to differences in their approach to sample selection. The most
well known are those associated with the work of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
(1999) and Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000).
1. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1999): The 1981 study involved a sample of
1,550 debtors from ten judicial districts in three states: Illinois, Pennsylvania
and Texas. This study was based upon what was reported in the bankruptcy
file. They converted their raw data to 1997 $ using the CPI.
2. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000): This is a 1991 study of bankrupts in
16 federal districts in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Texas, California and Tennessee. In
this study, written surveys were used to collect information on each bankrupt.
In addition, financial data on bankrupts in five of the districts were collected
from court records. They converted their raw data to 1997 $ using the CPI.
3. Based on court records, Domowitz and Sartain (1999) examine a sample of
households who filed for bankruptcy before and after the 1978 Bankruptcy Law
Amendments came into effect. Their data includes 580 Chapter 7 households
who filed for bankruptcy between October 1978 and March 1979 and 670 Chapter 7 bankrupts who filed between April and September 1980 from Southern and
Eastern New York, Southern Ohio, Eastern Kentucky and Central California.
They report that mean income was between $24,300 and $26,600 (in 1991 $).
4. Bermant and Flynn (1999) looked at a sample of approximately 2000 chapter 7
cases closed during the first half of 1998. They restricted attention to no-asset
chapter 7 cases, and report that of the 975,370 consumer chapter 7 cases filed
in 1997 all but 10,000 were closed as no-asset cases.
5. Lown and Rowe (2002) examine a sample of bankrupts in Utah from 1997.
Their data is based on a sample of 1486 Chapter 7 and 1081 Chapter 13 filed
in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Utah in 1997. Their data indicates that the average and median debts of chapter 13 filers were larger than those of chapter
7 filers. However, the median and average debt-income ratios were lower since
the average incomes of chapter 13 filers were higher than those of chapter 7.
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C

More on Income Uncertainty

We start with a new benchmark parametrization that matches the 1980 bankruptcy
rate, interest rate, and debt/gdp ratio and increase income uncertainty. The experiments reported in Table 10 confirm our findings: Plausible changes in uncertainty
only generate an tiny increase in filings, from 0.25% to 0.26% while lowering the debt
to earnings ratio somewhat. We also conduct the following thought experiment: If
one wanted to replicate the observed increase in filings solely through a change in income uncertainty, how far does one have to go? Experiment 3 shows that increasing
the variance of the transitory shocks by a factor of 30 does deliver the desired increase
in bankruptcy rates, but implies an interest rate as high as 60%. The variance of the
persistent shock has to be increased 7.5-fold to get the bankruptcy rate to increase
to the late 90’s level. This “success” has the debt level collapsing to 0.55% and the
average interest rate exceeding 37%.

Table 10: Changes in Income Uncertainty (1980 Benchmark)

1

Experiment

ση2

σ²2

Ch. 7
Filings

Avg. rb

Charge-off
Rate

Debt
Earnings

Benchmark

0.0375

0.025

0.25%

11.38 %

1.11%

5.02%

U.S. 1980-84

0.25%

10.95-12.05%

1.9%

5%

U.S. 1995-99

0.83%

10.93-12.84%

4.6%

9%

2
3

Transitory 1
Transitory 2

0.05
1.13

0.025
0.025

0.259%
0.83%

11.46%
59.68%

1.17%
31.0%

4.86%
2.61%

4
5

Persistent 1
Persistent 2

0.0375
0.0375

0.05
0.183

0.37%
0.83%

11.94%
37.5%

1.6%
19.8%

3.01%
0.55%
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Figure 5: Constructed Bankruptcy Rates per 1,000 Households (U.S.)
(holding age specific filings rates constant)
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Figure 6: Implied Bankruptcy Rates (per 1,000 25+ adults), U.S.
(holding marital status specific filing rates constant)
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